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Abstract
International investors launched three speculative attacks on the Thai baht in 1996 and 1997
following one high-profile banking failure, constant departures from the Bank of Thailand
(BOT), and slumping returns on stocks and real estate. Though the BOT succeeded in the
baht’s defense, the BOT’s depleted reserves were unable to fend off domestic troubles that
emerged in early 1997. The speculative attacks increased the cost of foreign-denominated
debt—which accounted for 18% of all bank lending—and forced up interbank lending yields.
The decade-long boom in foreign capital inflows had generally overvalued assets, and banks
found themselves in need of outside financing to meet short-term obligations. The Financial
Institutions Development Fund (FIDF), created in 1985 by the BOT to support troubled
institutions, quietly provided more than THB 400 billion (USD 17 billion) to nonbank finance
companies between March 1997 and July 1997. Ultimately, this support did not contain the
problem, and by August the BOT had temporarily suspended 58 finance companies. Crisis
support ended in January 1998, after the BOT permanently closed 56 of the 58 suspended
finance companies and converted FIDF loans to four commercial banks into equity. The
liquidity support to finance companies peaked at more than THB 434 billion outstanding in
August 1997. The FIDF lost at least THB 244 billion from the liquidity support to finance
companies and an unknown amount from the support of commercial banks. That burden,
about 15% of GDP, ultimately fell to the BOT and FIDF, which expects to repay FIDF bonds
by 2030.
Keywords: Asian Financial Crisis, emergency liquidity, FIDF, Thailand, Tom Yam Kung crisis

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering broad-based emergency lending programs. Cases are available from the Journal of
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Overview
Between 1980 and 1997, Thailand’s per
capita income nearly quadrupled because of
rapid export growth and high investment
levels from sources in and outside of the
country (Nabi and Shivakumar 2001). In
1993, the government adopted a framework
to promote foreign investment in the country
(Haksar and Giorgianni 2000). The Bank of
Thailand (BOT) administered the exchange
rate through a managed float (Nabi and
Shivakumar 2001); with stable conditions,
foreign lending through this framework
quickly accounted for 18% of all bank lending
(Haksar and Giorgianni 2000). This lending
helped secure Thailand’s continued growth
but exposed it to exchange rate movements.
Currency speculators attacked the baht three
times, and the BOT defended it three times,
initially ruling out devaluation. The size of the
foreign debt position “began to dictate the
policy agenda that finally led to the crisis”
(Nabi and Shivakumar 2001). The BOT
accumulated large forward positions that
whittled its international reserves from more
than USD 39 billion in November 1996 to just
over USD 1 billion in July 1997 (BOT 1998),
when the baht was floated and immediately
depreciated (Nabi and Shivakumar 2001).
Meanwhile, inside Thailand, financial
institutions experienced the growth in
foreign credit as a sharp increase in portfolio
investment (as opposed to relatively illiquid
foreign direct investment). With bank
reserves
growing
slightly,
portfolio
investment more than doubled between
1993 and 1997. This growth exposed
institutions to a loss of investor confidence
and, ultimately, further deterioration of the
baht. Confidence-busting signs appeared in
1996, when the mid-sized Bangkok Bank of
Commerce collapsed, followed by the
country’s largest decline in exports, low bank
profit growth, and a slump in real estate. The
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Key Terms
Purpose: “to provide financial assistance to troubled
financial institutions, containing financial damages
and mitigating the threat to stability of the financial
institution system” (BOT n.d.)
Launch Dates

February 1997
(operational);
August 1997
(announcement of
restructuring plan);
December 1997
(permanent closure of
56 finance companies)

Expiration Date

January 1998

Legal Authority

One emergency decree
in 1985 authorizing the
facility; another in 1997
authorizing FIDF to
relinquish collateral

Peak Outstanding

THB 434 billion in
August 1997

Participants

Up to 91 nonbank
finance companies and
four commercial banks

Rate

Unknown

Collateral

THB 800 billion from
finance companies in
government bonds and
promissory notes

Loan Duration

Loan maturities
unknown

Notable Features

Support not disclosed,
funded by repos

Outcomes

56 of 58 suspended
finance companies
closed; FIDF lost THB
244 billion, ultimately
paid by banks and
taxpayers
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burst real estate bubble proved significant because finance companies—Thai nonbank
lenders that took deposits—had concentrated exposures to real estate and consumer loans
(Nabi and Shivakumar 2001; BOT 2003a).
Finance companies had also borrowed almost exclusively in the short or medium term (BOT
2003a; Nabi and Shivakumar 2001). Thailand’s regulatory framework was too slow to
monitor problems. For instance, it considered loans performing until 12 months of
delinquent. In 1997, deposit runs began as depositors “fled to quality,” moving much of their
deposits to commercial banks (Haksar and Giorgianni 2000).
In response, a corporation controlled by the BOT to support troubled institutions called the
Financial Institutions Development Fund (FIDF) lent heavily to distressed finance companies
(Tunyasiri 1997). The FIDF was established in 1985 to mitigate threats to financial stability.
It received funding through fees it charged Thai financial institutions and from the BOT,
which also appointed the FIDF’s officers. Despite the FIDF’s legal status as a separate entity,
the World Bank (1990) found that it operated much like an arm of the BOT. Santiprabhob
(2021), the former BOT governor, noted it had few permanent staff and relied on BOT staff
during the crisis.
Between March 1997 and July 1997, the FIDF provided more than THB 400 billion (USD 17
billion)3 in liquidity support to Thailand’s 91 finance companies (Lindgren et al. 2000;
Haksar and Giorgianni 2000; BOT 2009a).4 It provided this support without informing the
public (Lauridsen 1998; Prateepchaikul 1997), later defending its actions—if not its decision
to not disclose support—as a necessary measure to increase financial sector liquidity
(Meesane and Tunyasiri 1998). Publicly, the BOT announced in late June that it had
suspended 16 finance companies because their capital was inadequate. It also said at the
time that it would not suspend any more finance companies (Lindgren et al. 2000). Later,
cabinet members alleged that the BOT had failed to report FIDF activities, though it is not
clear whether the BOT was legally required to disclose FIDF lending (Meesane and Tunyasiri
1998). But other finance companies were still struggling. On August 5, 1997, the BOT
suspended 42 more finance companies, despite having said there would be no further
suspensions (Lindgren et al. 2000). This represented the end of the FIDF’s undisclosed
liquidity support, although the FIDF did continue to provide support to closed and open
financial companies. (Hasker and Giorgianni 2000; World Bank 1997).

3 The

baht was fixed at THB 25=USD 1 until July 2, 1997. It then peaked above THB 50 per dollar before settling
around THB 40 to the dollar (Nabi and Shivakumar 2001). A Bank of Thailand report indicates that as of the
end of July 1997, finance companies’ liabilities to FIDF were THB 410.6 billion (BOT 2009a).
4 The data that we have located regarding FIDF lending is somewhat imprecise. Sources (for example, Hasker
and Giorgianni 2000 and World Bank 1997) indicate that the FIDF lent to suspended finance companies, nonsuspended FCs, and also to some commercial banks, although it is not always clear how much was lent to which
group at which time. However, one World Bank report (World Bank 1997) cites the Bank of Thailand as the
source for the following amounts outstanding as of the end of August 1997: Loans to suspended finance
companies, THB 368 billion; loans to 33 open finance companies, THB 16 billion; loans to banks, THB 128
billion; total: THB 512 billion.
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The FIDF funded its intervention in finance companies by issuing bonds and entering
repurchase agreements with the same large commercial and foreign banks that received
deposits from weakened financial institutions (Lindgren et al. 2000; Santiprabhob 2003).
FIDF repos pushed up seven-day rates and distorted the short-term market, making the FIDF
eager to end its liquidity support (Suthiwart-Narueput and Pradittatsanee 1999;
Sirithaveeporn and Yuthamanop 1998).
To exit its crisis support, the FIDF assumed significant losses on its support to finance
companies and commercial banks. In October 1997, it relinquished preferential claims on
counterparty collateral (Emergency Decree B.E. 2540 1997; World Bank 1997). In
December, the BOT closed 56 of the 58 suspended finance companies, ending any possibility
of repayment without a state-facilitated resolution process. Also in December, the FIDF
began converting large amounts of its liquidity support to commercial banks to equity,
recapitalizing the banks in the process (Haksar and Giorgianni 2000). As markets calmed,
the FIDF continued to provide liquidity through the end of the 1990s (see Figure 1) and
operated as a standing facility well after the end of the Asian Financial Crisis.
The FIDF recovered between THB 300 billion and THB 700 billion from its liquidity
operations. There is both uncertainty and ambiguity in these estimates. The uncertainty
comes from the fact that recovery could come from a number of different sources, each of
which owed the FIDF for more than just liquidity support. The ambiguity comes from the
different definitions of liquidity support among the documents surveyed. The FIDF
eventually restructured its liabilities as long-term debt by issuing THB 776 billion in bonds
(BOT 2002). As of 2015, the FIDF—which ultimately assumed financial responsibility for the
debt—expected to repay its loans by 2030 (Emergency Decree B.E. 2555 2012;
Sangwongwanich 2015).
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Figure 1: Non-Repo Liabilities Owed to the Bank of Thailand

Note: Finance company data shows the liabilities owed explicitly to the FIDF, while commercial bank data does
not disaggregate its liabilities to the BOT.
Source: BOT 2009a; BOT 2003b.

Summary Evaluation
The FIDF provided finance companies and banks with liquidity support equal to 22% of GDP
in its fight against the Asian Financial Crisis (Lindgren et al. 2000). However, a regulatory
framework that limited FIDF’s ability to gauge the health of financial institutions and the
high cost of borrowing exposed the FIDF to substantial risks. Moreover, inconsistent
communication damaged market confidence, hampering the efforts of FIDF and the BOT to
contain the crisis (Nabi and Shivakumar 2001), causing the FIDF to close finance companies
and release its claims on collateral. These measures, in turn, hurt the ability of the FIDF to
collect on its debtors (World Bank 1997). It was able to recover a significant portion of this
debt through debt-to-equity conversions and collections by the asset management company
created by the government to recover finance company loans (Santiprabhob 2003). The FIDF
ultimately lost more than THB 400 billion after accounting for these recoveries (BOT 2002).
Still, most observers argue that the FIDF averted the total collapse or nationalization of
Thailand’s domestic banking sector (Lindgren et al. 2000; Sangwongwanich 2015).

1019

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 4 Iss. 2

Context: Thailand 1996–1997

GDP
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)
GDP per capita
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)
Sovereign credit rating
(five-year senior debt)

USD 183.0 billion in 1996
USD 157.9 billion in 1997
USD 3,044 in 1996
USD 2,468 in 1997

Size of banking system
Size of banking system
as a percentage of GDP
Size of banking system
as a percentage of financial system
Five-bank concentration of banking system
Foreign involvement in banking system
Government ownership of banking system
Existence of deposit insurance
Sources: Bloomberg, FIDF 1997.
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S&P: AA in 1997
S&P: A in 1997
USD 260.0 billion
USD 252.6 billion
142% of 1996 GDP
160% of 1997 GDP
Data not available in 1996
Data not available in 1997
63.7% in 1996
65.3% in 1997
Data not available in 1996
Data not available in 1997
Data not available in 1996
Data not available in 1997
None in 1996
Blanket guarantee issued in
1997
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Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: The FIDF was not issued a public mandate for liquidity support.
The minutes of crisis-era BOT meetings are not public, so it is difficult to pin down the FIDF’s
precise mandate. A parliamentary commission investigated the FIDF and wrote that the BOT
considered liquidity support only as a measure to buy time (Nukul Commission 1998), while
the BOT governor said, “The bank did it because it wanted to boost the liquidity of the
financial sector” to resolve a crisis of confidence (Meesane and Tunyasiri 1998). As an
institution, FIDF’s stated purpose from its creation was “reconstructing and developing the
financial institution system to accord its strength and stability,” and it was not configured to
respond quickly to a financial crisis (BOT 2018).
2. Legal Authority: The Bank of Thailand Act and one 1997 amendment authorized
the FIDF to provide liquidity support.
A royal decree in 1985 first created the FIDF as a legally distinct entity within the BOT
(2018). At the onset of the crisis, FIDF’s powers included lending money, investing in
financial institutions, and supporting creditors (World Bank 1990). In 1997, liquidity
problems deepened to threaten finance company creditors, prompting an emergency decree
in October that allowed the FIDF to relax collateral requirements when the FIDF’s board of
directors “deem[ed] it necessary to restore the fairness and soundness of financial system”
(Emergency Decree B.E. 2540 1997).
3. Part of a Package: Liquidity support was independent of other programs.
No other government bodies coordinated with the FIDF to support Thailand’s domestic
institutions. Coordinated measures began only after the 58 finance companies were
suspended and the support was made public.
4. Management: The BOT decided who sat on the FIDF board.
Though legislation made the FIDF a separate legal entity, it was controlled by the BOT. The
board of directors was part of the central bank; the BOT governor chaired the board of
directors; and BOT officials appointed the FIDF manager. The former BOT governor said that
board members were not likely to disagree with BOT experts (Santiprabhob 2021). A former
manager of the Fund said that each loan larger than THB 50,000 required the BOT governor’s
approval (Yuthamanop 1998).
Cabinet members suggested that the BOT had a legal responsibility to report FIDF activities,
though primary source documents and academic works considering the disclosure
framework of the FIDF were not found. It seems clear that the FIDF was accountable only to
the BOT in practice. In 1998, Parliament created the Nukul Commission to identify the causes
of the crisis and to review the FIDF’s support of distressed financial institutions. Its report
said that the FIDF:
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itself lack[ed] independence. To inspect any institution’s financial position, it had to
depend on the BOT’s Financial Institutions Supervision and Examination Department. In
order to expedite action by the Fund, the management board of the Fund has given broad
powers to the Chairman (who is also BOT’s governor), rendering it incapable of
scrutinising BOT’s action carefully (Nukul Commission 1998).
5. Administration: FIDF extended support on a case-by-case basis.
There is little information on how the FIDF selected counterparties. When the BOT
suspended 16 finance companies in June, it cited their capital and liquidity needs (Lindgren
et al. 2000). The BOT governor said that market observers viewed the suspensions with
suspicion because the BOT did not give the criteria it used to identify undercapitalized firms
(Santiprabhob 2003). When the BOT later suspended 42 more finance companies, it again
cited concerns about their solvency, but a World Bank report said that the FIDF had made
the decision based on the companies’ level of indebtedness (World Bank 1997). The World
Bank noted that the regulatory framework did not allow authorities to quickly monitor the
health of finance companies and banks. For instance, loans were considered performing until
12 months of delinquency, which overestimated asset quality (Haksar and Giorgianni 2000).
As a result, the FIDF—which had little permanent staff and borrowed officials from the
BOT—relied on prior bank examinations when it loaned to finance companies (Santiprabhob
2021).
6. Eligible Participants: FIDF lent to finance companies..
The Bank of Thailand Act (BOT 2018) allowed the FIDF to transact with any counterparty. In
practice, the FIDF was created to support nonbank finance companies, of which there were
91 in 1997. During the first part of the year, FIDF lending to finance companies grew
significantly, from THB 16.8 billion at the end of 1996 to THB 410.6 billion at the end of July,
immediately before the second round of suspensions (BOT 2009a). The size of these
institutions relative to Thailand’s financial sector is not known, but 58 of these finance
companies—those that were suspended by the BOT in June and August 1997—represented
the majority of Thailand’s finance companies and 14% of its financial sector (Haksar and
Giorgianni 2000). The FIDF also provided loans to several banks. The public was aware that
the four banks were distressed but not that they were receiving aid at the scale that the FIDF
provided; these banks were Bangkok Metropolitan, First City, Siam City, and Bangkok Bank
of Commerce.
7. Funding Source: FIDF relied on repurchase agreements and longer-maturity
bonds, later assumed by the government, to finance its crisis interventions.
The Bank of Thailand Act (BOT 2018) allowed the BOT to allocate money from its reserves
to the FIDF, but, in practice, the FIDF issued debt and entered repurchase agreements to
finance its liquidity support. In July 1996, the FIDF board decided to issue its first THB 10
billion in bonds “to fund the system’s mushrooming liquidity needs” (Nukul Commission
1998). The BOT, along with commercial banks, purchased these bonds (Lindgren et al. 2000,
95). But the FIDF could not issue long-term bonds, and Santiprabhob (2021) suggested that
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the FIDF would need substantial BOT subscription to provide several hundred billion baht
in support. However, as the central bank, the BOT could not purchase unlimited amounts of
FIDF bonds, lest it violate legal restrictions on financing government activities.
More substantial was the FIDF’s repo activity. These borrowings amounted to as much as
THB 350 billion a month (BOT 2006). Santiprabhob (2003; 2021) described a circular flow
of funds (see Figure 2) between weaker financial institutions, healthy—and often foreign—
commercial banks, and the FIDF. As depositors fled the weak institutions, they deposited
money in healthy commercial banks. To support weak institutions, the FIDF lent short-term
funds by borrowing from those healthy banks. Seven-day repo rates in excess of 14%
prevailed for a year starting in July 1997 (Suthiwart-Narueput and Pradittatsanee 1999), but
the FIDF continued to refinance these agreements multiple times a week as depositors fled
the weak finance companies for the FIDF’s creditors (Santiprabhob 2003). The FIDF decided
to use repos to keep liquidity support short to prevent the courts from finding that the FIDF’s
intervention amounted to capital support (Santiprabhob 2021).
Figure 2: Flow of Funds during the 1997 Financial Crisis

Source: Santiprabhob 2003.

In April 1998, with hundreds of billions in outstanding claims on the recipients of liquidity
support, Thailand moved to stop entering repurchase agreements in favor of governmentissued debt. The Minister of Finance had said that the FIDF had “seriously unbalanced the
short-term money market, affecting liquidity and causing interest rates to stay high”
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(Sirithaveeporn and Yuthamanop 1998). An emergency decree authorized the FIDF to issue
long-term local debt (the term of the FIDF’s previous debt is unknown) (Sirithaveeporn and
Yuthamanop 1998), and, on August 14, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and BOT announced a
THB 500 billion tranche of FIDF bonds guaranteed by the MOF to assume FIDF losses
(Nimmanahaeminda and Sonakul 1998). In 2000, the MOF guaranteed bonds issued by the
FIDF worth THB 112 billion (BOT 2002). In 2002, the BOT estimated FIDF’s total losses at
THB 1.4 trillion: at least THB 430 billion can be attributed to liquidity support for finance
companies (Lauridsen 1998), with an almost equal amount of liquidity support for banks
(later converted to equity; see Santiprabhob 2003). See Figure 3 for a visualization of the
repo volume during the crisis and the rates charged on repo borrowing.
Figure 3: Repo Volume and the Seven-Day Repurchase Rate

Source: BOT 1999; BOT 2006.

Thailand then passed an emergency decree empowering the MOF to issue up to THB 780
billion in bonds to cover the remaining losses. The government issued THB 300 billion of
savings bonds in 2002. Originally, the BOT paid the outstanding principal out of its profits,
while the MOF paid the interest (BOT 2002), but an Emergency Decree in 2012 made the
BOT responsible for both components to free up space in the nation’s budget for flood
recovery (Emergency Decree B.E. 2555 2012). In 2015, the FIDF said that it expected to
repay its debt by 2030 (Sangwongwanich 2015) and reported THB 741 billion in debt
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outstanding in December 2020 (Public Debt Management Office 2021). See Figure 4 for a
depiction of the breakdown of FIDF bondholders.
Figure 4: Holdings of FIDF Bonds

Source: BOT 2003b; BOT 2009a.

Prior to the crisis, the FIDF had levied an annual 0.1% fee on deposits of its member
institutions (World Bank 1997). This money was originally intended to capitalize the FIDF
and fund operating expenses (World Bank 1990). Given that deposits hovered just above 4
trillion baht during 1997 (Haksar and Giorgianni 2000), this fee could have brought the FIDF
slightly more than 4 billion baht annually, just 1% of the liquidity support provided in early
1997. Emergency Decree B.E. 2540 (1997)—which also allowed the FIDF to make unsecured
loans—enabled the FIDF Management Committee to raise the fees it charged member
institutions, but only up to 1% of deposits. Rather, credit from the BOT and proceeds from
investments provided the FIDF with the monies it used to inject capital in distressed
institutions following a banking crisis in 1985. The FIDF did not carry an explicit mandate to
insure the deposits of its member institutions, but the World Bank (1990) believed that it
would insure deposits should a crisis hit.
The FIDF bore heavy losses for the sake of finance company creditors. In September 1997,
the MOF said that the loans of just over THB 500 billion had been secured by collateral worth
more than THB 800 billion (Notharit 1997). These were largely preferential claims in a
position senior to the borrowers’ other unsecured creditors. Yet the World Bank (1997)
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estimated the value of collateral securing finance company liquidity support at less than 50%
of the FIDF’s exposure. In part, this devaluation was caused by the country’s currency crisis,
but Santiprabhob (2003) notes that debtors of finance companies were unable to refinance
or negotiate for their collateral once those finance companies had been suspended. The
suspension served to further squeeze liquidity in the Thai financial system. The FIDF’s
preferential claims also hurt finance company creditors, which could not access the collateral
promised to them (World Bank 1997). Once the FIDF decided to release its preferential
claims on collateral, it of course limited its recovery opportunities.
8. Program Size: The level of support was not predetermined and rose to THB 434
billion by August 1997.
The FIDF provided increasing amounts of support to finance companies during the first part
of 1997. Amounts outstanding stood at THB 16.8 billion at the end of 1996 and rose
dramatically, beginning in February, to peak at THB 434 billion at the end of August, shortly
after suspension of an additional 42 finance companies was announced (BOT 2009a). The
FIDF continued to provide funding to closed and open finance companies and to some banks
through the end of the year, when 56 of the 58 suspended finance companies were closed
permanently. Such funding also continued into 1998, as the FIDF pursued its restructuring
programs (Hasker and Giorgianni 2000; World Bank 1997).
9. Individual Participation Limits: Participants borrowed without limit.
No documents suggest that the FIDF capped participants’ borrowing limits. Some finance
companies borrowed more than four times the value of their capital (Lindgren et al. 2000).
10. Rate Charged: The FIDF offered above-market rates.
In late 1997, the BOT tied rates to the BOT repo rate plus a variable penalty between 1% and
2.5%, depending on the level of indebtedness and size of support if uncollateralized (World
Bank 1997). As shown in Figure 3, this rate sometimes exceeded 20% in 1997 and 1998.
Santiprabhob (2021) and a BOT official working in 1997 said that the rates for liquidity
support were at market prices or slightly above, in keeping with lender-of-last-resort
principles. However, the World Bank (1997) said that the FIDF provided support at belowmarket rates between March 1997 and July 1997. The World Bank cited the FIDF’s decision
to not impose penalty rates as a cause of its ballooning liabilities.
After the support ended, many companies (especially those finance companies that the BOT
suspended) faced difficulties repaying their debts. The Fund allowed debtors to submit
rehabilitation plans and extend the length of repayment up to eight years. The FIDF charged
a penalty rate to suspended institutions when compared to nonsuspended institutions
(World Bank 1997), though very little of this rehabilitated debt would ultimately be repaid
(BOT 2009a).
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11. Eligible Collateral: FIDF loans were secured by government bonds before deposit
runs deepened.
FIDF support originally required government bonds as collateral, but finance companies
began shedding their liquid assets in the summer of 1997 amid deposit runs. As these runs
intensified, the FIDF began providing support against collateral of dubious value, including
promissory notes of finance company debtors that would ultimately be worthless when
many of those issuers entered bankruptcy (Santiprabhob 2003). Additionally, much of the
collateral the FIDF required was not perfected (World Bank 1997).
Following the suspension of 58 finance companies in August 1997, the government weighed
two actions that could free up FIDF collateral to recovery by private creditors: the release of
the FIDF’s preferential claims on debtor collateral and the provision of unsecured liquidity
support by the FIDF. If the FIDF could not release the collateral securing its emergency loans
to finance companies, then the bankruptcy of a finance company would simply push its
nonperforming loans to its creditors, shielding the FIDF at the expense of the financial sector
it was created to protect. In October, Emergency Decree B.E. 2540 (1997) granted the FIDF
the authority both to release collateral and to make new unsecured loans.
12. Loan Duration: Public documents do not indicate the maturities of FIDF loans.
If the FIDF provided liquidity support at a standard maturity, the documents surveyed do
not indicate what that may have been. Santiprabhob (2021) suggested that credit was oncall for a short term. Given that the structure of funding was tied to seven-day repurchase
agreements, support may have carried seven-day maturities. In any case, the MOF closed 56
of the 58 suspended finance companies in December 1997, before those companies repaid
their debts. The MOF’s announcement ended the FIDF’s large-scale liquidity support of
finance companies (Haksar and Giorgianni 2000), leaving the FIDF with more than THB 400
billion in unpaid claims on finance companies (BOT 2006; Lauridsen 1998). (For a
breakdown of support by whether finance company counterparties were open or closed, see
Haksar and Giorgianni 2000.) FIDF crisis intervention ended in January 1998, after the
government nationalized four commercial banks (Lauridsen 1998). As markets calmed, the
FIDF continued to provide liquidity through the end of the 1990s (see Figure 1) and operated
well after the end of the Asian Financial Crisis.
13. Other Conditions: Participants do not appear to have been subject to other
conditions.
Support did not appear to carry any other conditions. After the undisclosed support ended,
the FIDF imposed conditions on borrowing from the credit line.
14. Impact on Monetary Policy Transmission: No documents suggest a strategy to
counteract the support’s effects on monetary policy transmission.
Documents surveyed do not discuss the transmission of BOT monetary policy.
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15. Other Options: The support to finance companies was Thailand’s first measure to
combat its banking crisis.
Though Thailand had no deposit guarantee prior to 1997, observers such as the World Bank
(1990) believed that it was widely assumed that the FIDF and government offered an implicit
guarantee that it would not let depositors sustain a loss of their monies on deposit. The FIDF
(1997) made this guarantee explicit in 1997, when it insured “all depositors and creditors of
financial institutions that still operate[d] normal business” for two years (Mehta 1997). The
FIDF pledged to pay those insured within 30 days of their claims. There does not appear to
have been a cap on account or credit sizes, though the FIDF would not pay excessive interest
rates over those offered by the largest Thai commercial banks (FIDF 1997).
The FIDF financed this blanket guarantee by issuing its government-backed bonds (FIDF
1997). “Despite, or perhaps because of, the large fiscal cost of the government’s emergency
guarantee of deposits, the market did not view the move as credible” (Nabi and Shivakumar
2001). However, the government was still responsible for paying out to depositors and
creditors, lest it be viewed as even less credible. The World Bank (1997) said that measures
such as the blanket guarantee increased the cost of the crisis to the Thai government.
16. Similar Programs in Other Countries: Research did not determine any similar
programs in other countries.
Research did not determine similar programs in other countries at the time.
17. Communication: The FIDF did not disclose support until after finance companies
were suspended.
When the Thai Parliament learned of the extent of borrowing, the FIDF had already lent
several hundred billion baht. The first indications came in early July, when a Member of
Parliament accused the Prime Minister of wasting some THB 350 billion to rescue finance
companies (Tumcharoen 1997). This episode appeared to have gone unnoticed. A month
later, however, the BOT suffered a storm of criticism after it reported lending THB 430
billion—about 10% of GDP (Lauridsen 1998)—to finance companies before their
suspension and ultimate failure (Tunyasiri 1997; Prateepchaikul 1997). At this point, the
Prime Minister defended the FIDF on the basis that it had secured collateral against the loans
(Tunyasiri 1997). The Minister of Finance said that the collateral outweighed the liquidity
support by THB 800 billion to THB 500 billion (Notharit 1997).
Moreover, the BOT had “repeatedly guaranteed” the viability of the same finance companies
that had received liquidity support (Santiprabhob 2003). When the BOT announced in March
1997 that 10 finance companies needed to raise capital, it assured the solvency of the rest of
the subsector. When the BOT announced in June 1997 that it would suspend 16 finance
companies over capital inadequacy concerns, it again assured the market that the remaining
finance companies were in good financial health, and that it would suspend no more finance
companies (Lindgren et al. 2000). So, when it suspended 42 additional finance companies,
the subsequent announcement of a deposit guarantee and credit line was unable to assuage
concerns (Santiprabhob 2003).

1028

Thailand

Runkel

In late 1997, the MOF committed to reflecting the FIDF cost explicitly in the Thai budget as
part of a World Bank loan proposal (World Bank 1997). Following budgets and policy papers
communicated the outstanding FIDF debt (BOT 2002; Suthiwart-Narueput and
Pradittatsanee 1999; Public Debt Management Office 2021).
18. Disclosure: Liquidity support appeared in aggregate on the BOT’s balance sheet
after it was provided.
As discussed, the FIDF did not disclose its support until after finance companies were
suspended. Knowledge of the THB 430 billion liability came through the BOT’s balance-sheet
reporting. It is unclear, however, what responsibility or power the FIDF had to disclose its
support. The FIDF did not disclose how much it lent to each institution.
19. Stigma Strategy: Borrowers were insulated from stigma by a lack of disclosure.
No documents discussed the BOT’s strategy for dealing with borrower stigma. However, the
decision not to disclose liquidity support prevented market observers from stigmatizing the
borrowers. Market participants suspected that more finance companies than the BOT
reported were in danger, but they did not know which faced the gravest peril (Santiprabhob
2003).
20. Exit Strategy: Thailand closed 56 of the 58 suspended finance companies and
converted commercial bank debt to equity; some support was recovered.
There was no predetermined end date for FIDF intervention, but Santiprabhob (2021) cited
the cost of borrowing as an incentive for borrowers to find other lenders. Support effectively
ended when the possibilities for repayment ended. After the BOT suspended 16 finance
companies in June 1997, the MOF established a committee to facilitate their merger and
consolidation with Krung Thai Thanakit (KTT), a state-owned finance company
(Santiprabhob 2003; Haksar and Giorgianni 2000). Another 42 finance companies were
suspended in August and given 60 days to submit rehabilitation plans. In December, the MOF
announced the closure of all but two of the 58 suspended firms (Haksar and Giorgianni
2000).
The Financial Sector Restructuring Authority (FRA)—created out of the committee that
reviewed the first 16 suspensions (Santiprabhob 2003)—assumed the assets of closed
finance companies; it began auctions and reached agreements to compensate creditors of
the 42 companies later suspended. As of 2000, the FRA had recovered 28% of the THB 666
billion in nominal assets of the 56 finance companies (Haksar and Giorgianni 2000).
The FIDF took a different approach to the commercial banks to which it had provided
emergency liquidity. Four banks to which the FIDF had provided large amounts of liquidity—
Bangkok Metropolitan, First City, Siam City, and Bangkok Bank of Commerce—saw their
FIDF claims converted to equity while shareholder capital was simultaneously written down
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(Lauridsen 1998). This mechanism sometimes overcapitalized the banks, which had
returned THB 195 billion of capital to FIDF as of 2002 (Santiprabhob 2003).5
The FIDF lost at least THB 244 billion from liquidity support (Santiprabhob 2003, tables 5.2
and 6.2). There is both uncertainty and ambiguity in these estimates. The uncertainty comes
from the fact that recovery could come from a number of different sources, each of which
owed the FIDF for more than just liquidity support. Finance companies could have repaid
loans before their closure (if they were among those closed), but these repayments cannot
be disentangled from the finance company liabilities added during 1997 (BOT 2003a).
Ambiguity comes from the different definitions of liquidity support among the documents
surveyed. For example, Teo et al. (2000, 95) includes a measure of the debt-to-equity
conversion without describing its calculation, and claims that FIDF liabilities eclipsed THB 1
trillion. On the other hand, the BOT (2002) describes funds lost to liquidity support, deposit
insurance, and recapitalization, all of which could conceivably be debited to liquidity
support.

FIDF converted debt of the four commercial banks and Bank Thailand into equity that it then spread to stateowned Krung Thai Bank (KTB; see Santiprabhob 2003 for an account of KTB’s recapitalization).
5
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Appendix
Figure 5: Recapitalization of State-Owned Banks (1998–2002)

Source: Santiprabhob 2003.

Figure 6: Recoveries from FRA Auctions (1997–2001)

Source: Santiprabhob 2003.
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